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Malevolent Destruction of a Muslim Charity:
A Commentary on the Prosecution of Benevolence
International Foundation
Matthew J. Piers
Three years ago we, as a nation, suffered a ghastly act of mass
murder and terrorism apparently perpetrated by the self-proclaimed
Islamic fundamentalist group, al Qaeda. A remarkable thing occurred in
the wake of this tragedy: the United States, already feared and respected
as the world's sole remaining super power, became the object of a tidal
wave of international support and sympathy. Perhaps never before in our
nation's relatively short history have so many hands and hearts reached
out to us.
The potential to build on this historic outpouring of support and
sympathy, both domestically and internationally, was enormous. We
could have forged international alliances not previously available and
reaped increased economic benefits from the global economy, as well as
furthered the development of democratic processes in parts of the world
controlled by totalitarian or autocratic regimes. More immediately, we
could have developed an effective international response to the threat of
international terrorism, emanating from stateless, ideological, well-
funded and heavily armed networks of zealots.
We did none of those things. Indeed, our national policies and
actions since September 11, 2001 have resulted in making us more
isolated and more resented internationally than ever before. Never has
"the Ugly American" seemed uglier to so many people around the world.
This would be bad enough if we at least had the prospects of enhanced
economic and national security. Unfortunately, our government has
engaged in policies which make economic prosperity more elusive for
the vast majority of people in the United States as well as policies which
have made us more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than before.
According to many reliable accounts, our so-called "war on
terrorism"' seems to have been an abysmal failure. In the last three
1. The danger of characterizing an international police action against a stateless
criminal network as a "war" has been the subject of a growing amount of commentary.
See, e.g., Jonathan Rubin, The Truth About Terrorism, in 2 THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF
BOOKS, No. 1 (2005).
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years, the threat of world-wide terrorism has decentralized, multiplied
and heightened its firepower as well as its mass appeal throughout the
Muslim and Arab world. Osama bin Laden, the evil architect of mass
murder in New York, as well as probably in Madrid and elsewhere, is
alive and well, sending us pre-election political announcements, and
rapidly gaining more supporters and broader appeal and influence than
ever before. We waited far too long to go after him and his camps in
Afghanistan. By the time we finally invaded he had apparently fled into
Afghanistan's White Mountains, likely. with the assistance of his long-
time supporters at the highest levels of the Intelligence Service of our
government's fair weather ally, the Musharif government of Pakistan.
Rather than striking a blow against terrorism, our invasion of
Afghanistan resulted in displacing (perhaps only temporarily) the
medieval Islamist regime of the Taliban with a puppet government and
United States military occupation in Kabul, while the traditional pattern
of control by diverse, corrupt and brutal tribal warlords returned to run
the rest of the country.
If our efforts in Afghanistan were a failure, our next great offensive
in the unfortunately named "war on terrorism," the invasion of Iraq, has
been a failure on steroids. Apparently motivated by a combination of a
preexisting geopolitical agenda of a group of influential neo-
conservatives and a personal vendetta on the part of the current Bush
president for a failed assassination attempt on the former one, the
invasion of Iraq has predictably turned out to be a truly bad idea of
monumental proportions.
Now there can be no doubt that the justifications for this war were
lies. We now know that there was never any credible evidence of the
much ballyhooed "weapons of mass destruction," and even less evidence
of any ties between those unlikely bedfellows, Saddam's brutal Baathist
regime and Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. The only legitimate
remaining questions are who knew that the justifications were lies, and
when they knew. Saddam was, of course, a vile, sadistic dictator with
few, if any, redeeming qualities. Sadly, however, the world does not
lack for these, and if our government continues to throw the post-World
War II international world order aside and take unilateral military action 2
against all of them, we better start figuring out how to pay for it and what
to do with the populations of the territories we invade after our
2. With all due apologies to the small and shrinking collection of geopolitically
insignificant nations bullied and manipulated into taking part in what our government has
given the Orwellian moniker of "The Coalition of the Willing."
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extraordinary firepower destroys the existing government and
infrastructure. As was the case with Tito in Yugoslavia, Saddam's heavy
hand kept the disparate and largely incompatible religious and ethnic
groups in check in a nation created by a foreign power in the wake of a
World War. Forging a democratic consensus among Sunnis, Shia,
Assyrians, Kurds and others will be an elusive goal. Holding any
semblance of free and fair elections in January will also likely be
impossible given the rapidly spreading violence of the ongoing war.3
The invasion of Iraq has also thrown gasoline on an even more
dangerous fire than that of ethnic and religious sub-group rivalries. It
has provided convincing proof to a great number of people throughout
much of the Arab and Muslim world that we are the true descendants of
the crusaders of Western Europe, invading and conquering with blood
lust, and ideologically hostile to Islam. This invasion was the answer to
bin Laden's dreams. It has resulted in swelling the ranks of militant
Islamic fundamentalist groups all over the world, and triggered a
religious guerrilla war in Iraq which promises to go on for many more
years, while fanning the flames of worldwide terrorism. Rather than
striking a blow against terrorism, this invasion has perhaps done more to
encourage it than the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the Egyptian
repression of the Muslim Brotherhood combined.
In short, the Bush administration's foreign policies seem more as if
they were crafted by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahari than by
Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Condaleeza Rice. These policies
have aided the opponents of democracy more than countered them.
Exacerbating the increased instability and vulnerability caused by
these foolish, bloody and illegal foreign policies have been the shameful
and dangerous attacks on, and ceding of, democratic freedoms at home.
In the name of national security, all three branches of our federal
government have, to differing extents, been willing to cripple and
abandon many of the very liberties that make our constitutional
democracy worth fighting for. This hard right turn in the direction of a
police state might be more defensible if in fact we were engaged in
effective efforts to catch the terrorist evildoers and make the nation safer.
In fact, this appears not to be occurring. Our government's efforts to
3. This article was originally submitted pre-election. Given the boycott of the Iraqi
elections by most of the Sunnit Muslim population, as well as the growing number of
accounts of systemic electoral improprieties, this expectation seems, unfortunately, to
have been realized (notwithstanding President Bush's Orwellian pronouncements of
blooming democracy to the contrary).
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combat terrorism on the domestic front have been less than reassuring.
Not only has our government failed to take effective measures to protect
our ports and critical infrastructure, but it has also wasted huge resources
on ineffective bureaucratic restructuring and engaged in such ridiculous
efforts as putting the nation on meaningless color-coded "alerts," and
telling people to seal themselves inside their homes in case of germ
warfare (thus apparently revealing a federal preference for self-
asphyxiation over death by pathogens). The government has also
undertaken a series of high profile criminal prosecutions, which would, if
not for the human toll involved, be comical in their ineptitude.
For the last three years, at the direction of arguably the single worst
Attorney General in our nation's history, our taxpayer dollars have been
spent on largely unsuccessful investigations and prosecutions, which
seem to have little or nothing to do with actually combating terrorism.
4
Instead they often seem motivated primarily by the political desire to
make it look like the administration was catching the bad guys, when in
reality they had no idea who they were even trying to catch, let alone
how to do so. As with our foreign policy, a very large number of
innocent people have been harmed along the way as the administration
collected political scalps rather than dealt effectively with the threat of
terrorism.
In the year and a half after September 11, 2001, I got a close up
view of these incompetent and destructive efforts of our national
government when my law firm, and my partner, Mary Rowland, and I,
were retained to represent one of the three largest Muslim charities in the
U.S., Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. ("BIF").
BIF, along with the other two large Muslim charities operating in
the United States, Holy Land Fund for Relief of Palestine and Global
Relief Fund, have been systematically and effectively destroyed by the
United States government in the three years since September 11. The
legal arsenal used by the government to destroy these charities included
not only the controversial Patriot Act,5 but also the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act 6 ("IEEPA"), and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19967 ("AEDPA").
The Patriot Act was passed overwhelmingly by a frightened and
4. David Cole, The D.C. Gang That Couldn't Shoot Straight, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19,
2004, at M.
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2001).
6. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2002).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2001).
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confused Congress less than two months after September 11, without any
committee hearings or even any serious consideration of its content and
impact. Among its many other broad reaching provisions, it largely
removed the crucial line between national security intelligence gathering
and criminal investigation work, resulting in the government being able
to employ in criminal prosecutions intelligence information which is
often uncorroborated, outdated and extremely questionable on its face.
In the case of BIF (as indeed in the case of Iraq) much of it turned out to
be just plain false.
IEEPA is a little known and remarkable law which allows for an
executive branch administrative determination, without any notice or
hearing, which results in the blocking or freezing of all assets of the
person or entity. An IEEPA designation can result in an order forbidding
even United States citizens from giving or receiving essentially any
goods or services to or from any United States person without a "license"
from the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States Treasury
Department ("OFAC"). OFAC grants or denies requests for such
licenses based on completely standardless discretion and with no
practical right of appeal. An IEEPA designation can be tantamount to
the status of "internal banishment" that was employed by the apartheid
government of South Africa.
AEDPA provides for a standardless designation of "terrorist"
groups, also without notice or hearing. It further makes it illegal to
provide any assistance to these groups, even if it is done for purely
humanitarian reasons. Like the term "war," the term "terrorist" has lost
much of its meaning in its current widespread usage. Furthermore, such
"terrorist" designations have often been politically driven in the past,
without regard to true national security concerns. For instance,
throughout the 1980s, the United States State Department designated
Nelson Mandela's African National Congress as a terrorist organization.
Mandela, of course, went on to win world-wide acclaim as he and the
ANC founded democratic, post-apartheid South Africa. More recently,
throughout most of the 1990s, our government gave encouragement and,
it is widely believed, covert economic assistance to the Chechen forces
fighting for independence from Russia. This was done in an effort to
destabilize the post-Soviet Union Russian Federation. With the
geopolitical sea change that took place in the wake of September 11, our
8. The term has largely lost its original meaning of actions calculated to create fear
among a civilian population, and has come to mean acts of a violent nature with a
political purpose. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331(l)(A), (B) (2001).
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government turned around and designated the Chechen independence
fighters as "terrorists" in an effort to further an alliance with Russia
towards mutual cooperation in combating al Qaeda. In essence, we
agreed to recognize their "terrorists" in exchange for their help fighting
ours.
BIF began operations in 1993, and by the time our government
destroyed it, it was providing approximately three million dollars a year
in charitable funding to mostly Muslim parts of the world. The money
was raised primarily in mosques and Muslim communities across the
U.S. BIF's programs included orphan sponsorship in China, Bosnia,
Afghanistan and elsewhere; refugee relief in Pakistan and in the Russian
Federation; the operation of the only children's tuberculosis hospital in
the TB ravaged nation of Tajikistan; and the Charity Woman's Hospital,
the only obstetrical and gynecological hospital in the southern Russian
republic of Daghestan.
In October of 2001, an article was published in the New York
Times, indicating that unnamed persons within the government were
lobbying to investigate major Muslim charities in the United States,
including BIF, as possible sources of terrorist funding. 9 BIF approached
our law firm with a request that we contact the government and offer
them full cooperation with regard to any inquiry into BIF's activities,
including access to all documents and staff, in order to clear the charity's
name. We advised the client that neither the United States Attorney's
office nor the United States Department of Justice was engaged in the
business of "declaring innocence." The client, however, insisted that we
make every effort possible, so we proceeded to make contacts with the
United States Attorney's office in Chicago. For the next several weeks
we traded phone calls with the U.S. Attorney's office, presenting our
client's offer. In late November, we finally received a request from the
government for a meeting with the client to discuss the offer. We
informed the government that the executive director of the charity was
temporarily overseas, and requested that the meeting be scheduled upon
his return at the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
The government's "response" was to raid the BIF offices in Chicago
and New Jersey on December 14, 2001, blocking all of the charity's
financial assets and seizing substantially all of its physical property,
including all files, video and audiotapes, and computers. This action was
9. Judith Miller & Kurt Eichenwald, A Nation Challenged: The Investigation; U.S.
Set to Widen Financial Assault, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at Al, available at 2001
WLNR 2907811.
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taken without any charges or hearing, and pursuant to Foreign
Intelligence Security Act'0 powers enhanced by the Patriot Act." In lieu
of a warrant based on probable cause, the government proceeded under
an Attorney General Emergency Physical Search Authorization
("AGEPSA") authorized by the Attorney General and issued without
prior court review. In one of the many bizarre turns in this Alice in
Wonderland case, the government refused to provide us with a copy of
the AGEPSA or to make a photocopy of it, but did allow us to read it and
copy its entire contents down long-hand. Perhaps it was not a
coincidence that the AGEPSA revealed that the government's actions
were based on bad intelligence and a case of mistaken identity. The
government believed, wrongly, that BIF's executive director, Enaam
Arnaout, was someone named Samir Abdul Motaleb. We found out later
from Jane's Intelligence that Motaleb, who was much older than Arnaout
and believed to be dead, had been involved in something called the
Services Office, an entity in Pakistan in the late 1980s and very early
1990s, which provided support to the "Afghan Arabs" fighting the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, and which had a historic relation to what
became al Qaeda.
BIF's executive director immediately returned to the United States,
but he returned to a raided and blocked organization, which had no files,
no assets and no ability to engage in its charitable operations. At the
client's request, we continued to ask government officials to sit down
with the charity staff in order to assist with and expedite the
government's review of the materials that it had seized. As the matter
proceeded into the next year, it became painfully apparent that the
government was in dire need of such assistance, as its agents clearly had
no idea what the documents were that they had seized and were
reviewing, let alone their significance, if any. In addition, many of them
were written in Arabic, and the government had very few Arabic
translators available because, in spite of the obviously increasing threat
to national security from a number of Islamic fundamentalist groups in
the 1990s (including bin Laden's fatwah against the west in 1995), little
had been done to refocus the expertise of our national security agencies.
On behalf of BIF, we repeatedly urged the government to issue an
OFAC license, allowing funds to be released for the organization's
overseas charitable operation. We reminded the government that
10. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2000), amended by Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638
(2004).
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2001).
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shutting down the children's tuberculosis hospital in Tajikistan and
releasing the children carrying this highly contagious disease into the
general population would be tantamount to committing an act of germ
warfare. We offered to have attorneys from our firm travel with FBI or
other appropriate government agents, at the client's expense, to the sites
of BIF's overseas operations in order to assure that they were legitimate
charitable undertakings, and that the monies were being delivered for
charitable purposes. Although the government acknowledged the
legitimate, charitable nature of these activities, it steadfastly refused
these requests.
Faced with the prospect of destruction of the charity, BIF filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in
January 2002, alleging violations of the First, Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. Along with the complaint, we filed a detailed
preliminary injunction motion with affidavits attached from BIF's
executive director as well as from the directors of its charitable
operations in countries overseas.
Over the government's vigorous objections, the court ordered it to
promptly copy all computerized, taped and hard copy documents which
were seized, and to return them to BIF so that it could properly prosecute
the litigation.1 2 The government failed and/or refused to comply with the
court's timetable, and documents were returned very slowly over a
period of several months. Documents were also not returned in the
manner in which they had been kept, so a painstaking and costly process
had to be undertaken to reconstruct BIF's business records, file by file.
Even after initiating litigation, BIF continued to cooperate fully with
the government investigation. Current and former staff members were
made available for FBI interviews without need of subpoena. The level
of cooperation extended by BIF to the government, however, was
apparently not paralleled by the level of cooperation occurring between
agencies within the government. The raid of BIF's New Jersey offices
had been conducted by customs officers from the Treasury Department.
The Chicago raid, on the other hand, was directed by FBI agents. Some
of BIF's files were therefore in the possession of the Justice Department,
and others were with the Treasury Department. The Treasury
Department, which was engaged in an IEEPA investigation, was
apparently unwilling to share the documents in its possession with the
12. Benevolence Int'l Found. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d. 935 (N.D. I11. 2002).
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Department of Justice for its criminal investigation. In response to this
problem, at the request of the FBI and with consent of BIF, we sent a
letter to OFAC requesting that it share with the Department of Justice the
BIF materials seized by the Treasury Department. Our efforts at ending
this intergovernmental turf war were successful.
Mr. Arnaout, a Syrian refugee and United States citizen, whose
mother and siblings resided in Saudi Arabia, had informed us when he
returned from Bosnia that he needed to travel to Saudi Arabia at some
point prior to early May 2002 in order to renew his multi-year Saudi visa.
Expiration of this visa might have prevented him from engaging in
further visits with his elderly mother and other family members. We
informed the government that Arnaout intended to travel to Saudi Arabia
on April 3, 2002, and we were informed that the U.S. Attorney's office
did not wish him to leave the country. When we inquired whether that
meant that the government would stop him if he attempted to leave the
country, the government refused to answer that question, but would only
say that they had the ability to do so. We informed the government that,
in the wake of September 11, we had little doubt that as a practical
matter they had the ability to stop any person of Arab descent from
boarding an airplane anywhere in the United States, but that we were
seeking clarification as to Mr. Arnaout's legal status with regard to the
investigation of BIF and the basis of the government's authority to act.
No further response was forthcoming.
On April 2, 2002, the day before Mr. Arnaout was to leave the
country, he received a subpoena to testify before a grand jury on April
25. He therefore immediately cancelled his trip. Upon inquiry, the
government then confirmed that Mr. Arnaout was the target of a criminal
investigation. Accordingly, we informed the government that Mr.
Arnaout would assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination before the grand jury unless he was granted immunity, and
that he would testify if given immunity. We further informed the
government that we needed a resolution of this situation as quickly as
possible, as Mr. Arnaout's visa was set to expire on May 5. The
government decided on April 25 not to require Arnaout to appear before
the grand jury, but would not state whether or not he would be given
immunity, and insisted that his grand jury subpoena remain in effect.
Therefore, on April 29, we filed a motion with the Chief Judge of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, who was
charged with supervising grand jury proceedings, requesting that Mr.
Arnaout be allowed to travel, and that the government either discharge
9
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the subpoena or grant him immunity. The motion was scheduled for a
May 1 hearing. On April 30, Mr. Arnaout was arrested at his home in
the early hours of the morning and taken in handcuffs and shackles to the
Metropolitan Correctional Center, the federal detention facility in
downtown Chicago.
The government charged Arnaout and BIF with two counts of
perjury. The basis of the charge was a declaration of Arnaout which BIF
had filed in federal court in support of the preliminary injunction motion
in the pending civil case, in which, in pertinent part, he had denied that
BIF supported terrorism or any other form of violence. At the press
conference held that day by Patrick Fitzgerald, the United States
Attorney, the government hyped these charges, as a major step in the war
against terrorism. BIF's civil lawsuit was then stayed on the court's
motion, pending resolution of the criminal case.
The perjury charge was fatally flawed for legal reasons. It was
clearly contrary to a unanimous 1979 United States Supreme Court
decision, Dunn v. United States.13 It was also in direct violation of the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") Manual, which expressly stated (based on
Dunn) that a perjury charge under the pertinent statute was not available
in the case of submission of a false affidavit.14 Neither the violation of
clear Supreme Court precedent nor the contradiction in the DOJ's own
manual seemed to bother the government. It did, however, bother the
court, which dismissed the government's indictment in September 2002.
The government immediately filed a new charge of obstruction of
justice, based on the same conduct but different statutes. Because the
prior case had been dismissed, and the government maintained that the
new charges were not related to the prior perjury charges, the case was
assigned to a new judge. The new charges included an obstruction of
justice charge against BIF. Arnaout was also charged again, and was kept
without bail and in maximum security, solitary confinement throughout
the proceedings. He was transported to and from court for his
appearances in the most sensational manner possible, with the short,
three block route between the jail and the court house blockaded by
armored vehicles, and Mr. Arnaout, in handcuffs and shackles, escorted
by U.S. Marshals armed with machine guns.
In October 2002 (and again in January 2003) the government
obtained indictments of Arnaout charging that he had run BIF as a
13. 442 U.S. 100 (1979).
14. Department of Justice Manual, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines
/207102.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
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criminal enterprise to fund terrorism, including al Qaeda, the Chechen
independence fighters and the Bosnian army, in violation of Racketeer
Influenced in Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and as part of a
conspiracy, providing material support to terrorism by money laundering,
mail fraud and wire fraud. The charity, BIF was not named in the new
indictment, and was no longer a defendant in the proceedings. The
sensationalism attendant to the treatment of Arnaout was matched by
incendiary and unfounded statements made personally by Attorney
General Ashcroft at press conferences.
Ashcroft, accompanied by his entourage of national media,
appeared at an October press conference in Chicago to announce the new
charges. During that press conference the Attorney General vowed to
stop the "source of terrorist blood money" and described it as "sinister to
pray on good hearts to fund the works of evil." He proclaimed, in a
biblical tone, that "[t]here is no moral distinction between those who
carry out terrorist attacks and those who knowingly finance those
attacks." 
1 5
Ashcroft's press conferences appeared to be clear violations of the
Rule of Professional Conduct which forbids extra-judicial statements
which pose "a serious and imminent threat to the fairness of an
adjudicative proceeding. 1 6 (Issued in the Northern District of Illinois as
Local Rule 83.53.6). Leading members of the Chicago legal community
called, urging us to file disciplinary charges against the Attorney
General, while at the same time refusing to do so themselves claiming
that to do so would be "a career ender." We opted not to file such
charges for a slightly different reason, feeling that there was no
likelihood that they would be acted upon in a timely and/or favorable
manner under the circumstances, and that it was not in our client's
interest to increase the level of animosity with what appeared to be truly
a Justice Department run wild.
The press conferences were not the only conscious efforts on the
part of the government to poison the atmosphere and prevent a fair trial.
Equally distressing and even more frequent, were the government's
placement of documents into the public record for the apparent purpose
of having them published in newspapers. After the raids of BIF's two
15. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks at a Chicago Press Conference
Announcing the Indictment of Alleged Terrorist Financier (Oct. 9, 2002), at
www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/100902agremarksbifindictment.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2005) [hereinafter Ashcroft Remarks].
16. N.D. Ill. Loc. R. 83.53.6.
11
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United States offices, the government arranged for Bosnian authorities to
raid BIF related locations in Bosnia, and recovered a number of
documents relating to Arnaout's activities in the 1980s. These included a
1988 newspaper photograph of bin Laden, taken somewhere near the
Afghan/Pakistan border, in which a young Arnaout was shown in the
background. This photograph, as well as another from the same general
time and place which showed someone who looked like (but in fact was
not) Arnaout brandishing a rifle, appeared repeatedly on prominent
display in newspapers in Chicago and elsewhere around the country. In
addition, the OFAC investigation, utterly devoid of any semblance of due
process and relying on an administrative record replete with secret
evidence combined with newspaper articles and other rank hearsay,
resulted in a highly publicized designation of BIF as a "terrorist
organization" in November 2002.
Because of the conspiracy charges, the government was required by
Seventh Circuit precedent to make a proffer of the evidence sought to be
admitted under the co-conspirator hearsay exception (a so-called
Santiago proffer) for the court's review and ruling prior to trial. 7 In
furtherance of this obligation, the government prepared a 101 page
Santiago proffer with 248 exhibits consisting of largely unrelated
documents, and filed them in the court file with the obvious hope that
they too would be reported by the press. The trial judge, disturbed by the
government's attempt at creating further prejudicial publicity, as well as
the failure of the government to present any coherent conspiracy theory
based on this disparate collection of documents, denied the Santiago
proffer and struck the exhibits from the court record. "The proffer," the
judge found, "is devoid of analysis linking proffered hearsay to a specific
conspiracy."' 8 Although the court reserved ruling on the evidence until
trial, it noted that the government's behavior was "deeply disturbing"
and that "a significant amount of the government's.., proffer contains
materials that are not relevant to [Arnaout] nor probative of the charges
in the indictment(s), but rather are highly prejudicial matters suggesting
guilt by association."' 9
As the evidence was revealed during the course of the criminal
proceedings, it became clear that the government claims of terrorist
funding were baseless. Arnaout, it turned out, had known bin Laden in
17. United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978).
18. United States v. Arnaout, No. 02 Cr. 892, 2003 WL 255266, at *1 (N.D. I11.
Feb. 4, 2003).
19. Id.
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the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area in the late 1980s, when he was one
of thousands of young Arab men who went to support the war of
liberation against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This war was
openly supported by the United States government, and it is by now well
known that bin Laden himself received funding and support in his efforts
in the war from, among others, the governments of Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, and the United States. Although bin Laden and some of the
others involved in this war ended up forming what became the terrorist
organization al Qaeda during the 1990s, and Arnaout knew and had brief,
subsequent contacts with two or three reputed members of al Qaeda in
the years following the Afghan war, there was no evidence tying BIF or
Arnaout to terrorism, or supporting the allegation that BIF was a funding
source for al Qaeda. Indeed on the eve of trial the government revealed
that one of these reputed al Qaeda members had voluntarily met with the
government for several hours on two separate occasions and denied any
terrorism connection. He was not arrested. At the same time the
government revealed that a former high ranking al Qaeda security officer
who had been cooperating with the government since 1996 and was a
major source of information on the terrorist group had informed the
government in December 2001, shortly after the raid on BIF's offices,
that he had never heard of Benevolence International Foundation and
could not identify photographs of any of its employees or associates.
As the trial approached, two things became painfully clear. First, in
spite of the lengthy, massive, intrusive and expensive investigation, the
government had uncovered no evidence tying BIF to the funding of
terrorism. Second, the government's on-going publicity campaign had
created the prejudice that it sought. There appeared to be no way that
Arnaout could receive a fair trial in the context of the Attorney General's
and the United States Attorney's pronouncements, the OFAC
designation, and the recurring photograph of Arnaout and bin Laden. On
the eve of trial, a plea bargain was agreed to. Arnaout pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to defraud by not having informed all of BIF's donors that a
relatively small amount of the money that had been raised over the years
(about $300,000 out of $15,000,000) went, in the mid-1990s, to buy
tents, boots and blankets for the Bosnian army (with whom the United
States sided during the Bosnian war), and to purchasing uniforms for the
civilian government of the Chechen independence forces and boots, an
ambulance and medical supplies for their fighters (with whom, at the
time, our government was actively cooperating). Prior to September 11,
2001 the government would likely have lauded someone for such
13
PACE LAWREVIEW
activities. Likewise, in a different atmosphere, no defendant would have
pleaded guilty to such offenses. Under the sentencing guidelines (then
still mandatory), Arnaout was sentenced to eleven years in a medium
security federal penitentiary. Benevolence International Foundation, its
reputation having been dragged through the mud by the government, its
activities having been completely disrupted for better than a year, and its
assets having been depleted in prolonged legal proceedings, was
destroyed.
Since December 2001, the United States government has raided
several Islamic charities operating in this country, including BIF, Holy
Land Foundation, Global Relief Foundation, and the Sudan based
Islamic American Relief Agency. Not one of these raids has led to any
terrorism related criminal convictions. Last fall, a number of Muslim
groups requested that the United States government provide them with a
list of Islamic charities to which Muslims in the United States could
donate without being suspected of terrorist ties. The request was denied,
with an unhelpful statement from Bryan Sierra, a spokesman for the
Justice Department that: "[o]ur role is to prosecute violations of criminal
law. We're not in a position to put out lists of any kind, particularly of
any organizations that are good or bad., 20
As the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States ("the 9-11 Commission") noted:
[T]he investigations of BIF and GRF revealed little compelling evidence
that either of these charities actually provided financial support to al Qaeda
- - at least after al Qaeda was designated a foreign terrorist organization in
1999. Indeed, despite unprecedented access to the U.S. and foreign records
of these organizations, one of the world's most experienced and best
terrorist prosecutors has not been able to make any criminal case against
GRF and resolved the investigation against BIF without a conviction for
support of terrorism. Although the OFAC action shut down BIF and GRF,
that victory came at considerable cost of negative public opinion in the
Muslim and Arab communities, who contend that the government's
destruction of these charities reflects bias and injustice with no measurable
gain to national security.
21
It is hard to see how the government's activities with regard to
20. Terror-free Charities, THE JOURNAL NEWS (Westchester County, N.Y.), Oct. 22,
2004, at 6B.
21. JOHN ROTH ET AL., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES: MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 111 (2004), available at http://www.9-
I1 commission.gov/staff statements/91 1_TerrTravMonograph.pdf (last visited Apr. 11,
2005). See also Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 15.
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Muslim charities have had any positive effect on targeting terrorism. It
is easy to see, on the other hand, why these actions have been perceived
widely within the Islamic community and elsewhere as another example
of the unfair targeting of innocent Arabs and Muslims. One thing is
clear: critically needed resources for the many refugees and people living
in poverty and other dire circumstances throughout the Islamic world
have been terminated. As with its foreign policies, it would appear that
these actions on the part of our government will further serve the
interests of those who seek to convince Muslims around the world that
we are an enemy worthy of being targeted by violent attacks. One can
only hope that in its second term, the Bush administration will implement
policies that will mitigate the harm that it has caused for the past four
years. One can only hope that this will be done before it is too late.
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